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Smith: Limiting Liability of the Passive Lender under the Comprehensive

NOTES AND COMMENTS
LIMITING LIABILITY OF THE PASSIVE
LENDER UNDER THE COMPREHENSIVE
ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE,
COMPENSATION, AND LIABILITY
ACT OF 1980
I.

INTRODUCTION

A recently developed non-market related risk' facing lenders is the

devastating liability for clean-up costs under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA).2
CERCLA is a comprehensive statute designed broadly to confront the
severe hazardous waste problem in the United States.3 Generally, the
scope of liability under CERCLA has been broad.' In adhering to
Congress' intent,' three courts have implied that CERCLA's scope of
1. Non-market related risks are risks of ownership such as potential tort liability and loss due
to destruction by natural disaster. Malloy, Equity Participationsand Lender Liability Under CERCLA, 15 COLUM. J. ENvTL. L. 63, 64 (1990). Compare non-market related risks with market related risks "such as inflation or poor targeting of a real estate project to the demographics of an
area." Id
2. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 [hereinafter CERCLA], Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified in part at 42 U.S.C. § 9601-9657
(1982)) amended by Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 [hereinafter SARA],
Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613.
CERCLA clean-up costs can be exorbitant. See United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d
1550, 1553 (1lth Cir. 1990) (the EPA incurred costs of almost $400,000.00 to remove 700 fifty-five
gallon drums containing toxic chemicals and forty-four loads of material (including soil) containing
asbestos); United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 575-76 (D. Md. 1986) (the
EPA removed two hundred thirty-seven drums of chemical material and one thousand, one hundred
eighty tons of contaminated soil at a cost of more than $550,000.00); United States v. Mirabile, 15
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,992 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (cost of removing approximately five hundred, fifty drums of hazardous waste totaled almost $250,000.00).
3. The General Accounting Office, in 1988, speculated that there may be "as many as 425,380
potential [Sluperfund hazardous waste sites" in the United States. 18 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2043 (Jan.
22, 1988). The report estimated that the EPA could clean up 2,500 of those sites at a cost of $22.7
billion. Id.
4. See Barr, CERCLA Made Simple: An Analysis of the Cases Under the Comprehensive EnvironmentalResponsei Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, 45 Bus. LAW. 923, 941-47 (1990).
5. See infra notes 10-13 and accompanying text.

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1990

1

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 26 [1990], Iss. 1, Art. 3
TULSA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 26:75

liability could be extended to passive lenders. 6 Although the Act expressly grants an exemption to secured creditors, court interpretations
have applied the security interest exemption narrowly. 7 These interpretations arose due to the harried manner in which Congress enacted CERCLA and the resulting lack.of legislative history.' The only option at

this juncture is for Congress to confront judicial interpretations of the
security interest exemption under CERCLA and adopt amendments to
clarify the inconsistent conclusions.9

II. CERCLA:
A.

THE STATUTE

The PoliciesBehind CERCLA

Congress passed CERCLA with the intention of providing "an equitable solution to the environmental and health problems created by decades of reckless and irresponsible disposal of chemical wastes." 10 In
enacting CERCLA, Congress sought to hold those who cause chemical
harm responsible for the costs associated with hazardous waste clean-

up. 1 Legislative history indicates that Congress intended liability under
CERCLA to be both strict, and joint and several, though such a provi-

sion was not explicitly provided for in the Act."

An uncompromising

standard of liability, Congress believed, would create a "compelling incentive" for the responsible parties to prevent releases and thus protect
6. A "passive lender" as used within the context of this Comment refers to lenders who,
through transitory financial arrangements, have financial and ownership interests in property contaminated with hazardous waste.
7. See infra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
8. See In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor Proceedings, 675 F. Supp. 22, 25 n.2 (D.
Mass. 1987), and cases cited therein.
9. "A further round of amendments designed simply to clean up the discrepancies [in CERCLA] ... would go far to saving litigants' money and courts' time as well as the statute itself from
interpretations contrary to the intent of Congress." In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor
Proceedings, 716 F. Supp. 676, 681 n.6 (D. Mass. 1989).
10. H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 62, reprintedin 1980 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEws 6119, 6139 (statement of Albert Gore, Jr.).
11. S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1980). The statute "assures that those who
benefit financially from a commercial activity internalize the health and environmental costs of that
activity into the costs of doing business." Id. See also Allied Corp. v. Acme Solvents Reclaiming,
Inc., 691 F. Supp. 1100, 1105 (N.D. Ill. 1988) ("CERCLA seeks to expedite the cleanup of hazardous waste sites and to ensure the allocation of cleanup costs among responsible parties.") (citing 126
CONG. REc. 30, 932 (1980)).
12. S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1980). The committee report declared that "[t]o
establish provisions of liability any less than strict, joint, and several liability would be to condone a
system in which innocent victims bear the actual burden of releases, while those who conduct commerce in hazardous substances which cause such damage benefit with relative impunity." Id. See
also notes 27-35 and accompanying text.
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the general public from the threat of hazardous waste. 13
B.

The Superfund
In addition to creating liability for hazardous waste contamination,

Congress established provisions to pay for clean-up expenses prior to
seeking reimbursement from responsible parties. CERCLA created the
14
"Superfund" for the purpose of cleaning up hazardous waste sites.
Pursuant to CERCLA, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)15 is
authorized to compel the clean-up of a hazardous waste site. 6 Furthermore, the EPA can contract for the clean-up and then seek reimbursement for response costs17 and natural resources damages' 8 after the
completion of the clean-up. 19
C.

The Plaintiffs Case

CERCLA's liability section 2' clearly sets forth the elements which
must be proved in order for a plaintiff to recover response costs. To

prevail, the plaintiff2 ' must establish: that the potentially responsible

party (hereinafter referred to as "PRP") falls within one of the classes of
liable persons;2 2 that the contaminated site is a "facility; ' 2 3 that a release
or threatened release24 of any hazardous substance2 5 from the site has
13. S.REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1980).
14. The Hazardous Substances Superfund, originally created under CERCLA, Pub. L. No 96510, § 221, 94 Stat. 2767, 2801 (1980) (codified in 42 U.S.C. § 9631 (1982)), was amended in 1986 by
SARA, Pub. L. No. 99-499, § 204(a), 100 Stat. 1613, 1696 (1986). Currently, the appropriations for
the "Hazardous Substance Superfund" are made pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 9507 (1988).
15. CERCLA authorizes the President to conduct response actions. 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (1988).
However, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 9615 (1988), the President delegated this authority to the Administrator of the E.P.A. Exec. Order No. 12,580, 52 Fed. Reg. 2,923 (1987).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (1988).
17. The term "response' is defined in 42 U.S.C. § 9601(25) (1988) as "remove, removal, remedy, and remedial action:, all such terms (including the terms 'removal' and 'remedial action') inlude enforcement activities related thereto." Id.
18. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(C) (1988). For an in depth analysis of "damages" as defined under
CERCLA, see In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor Proceedings, 716 F. Supp. 676 (D.
Mass. 1989).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a) (1988).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1988).
21. See 42 U.S.C. § 9612(a) (1988). A "claimant" must first present the Superfund claim to the
potentially responsible parties. If the claim has not been satisfied within sixty days, the claimant
may then present the claim to Superfund for payment. Id. However, claims for damages for injury
to natural resources may only be asserted by the President, as trustee for the natural resources, or by
an Indian tribe if affected by the natural resources damages. 42 U.S.C. § 961 1(b)(1) (1988).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)-(4) (1988). See infra note 33 and accompanying text.
23. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9) (1988).
24. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22) (1988).
The term "release" means any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying,
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occurred; and finally, that the release
or threatened release caused the
26
plaintiff to incur response costs.
D. The Standardof Liability Under CERCLA
As determined by federal common law, the standard of liability
under CERCLA is strict, joint and several, and retroactive. While a preliminary draft of CERCLA contained a provision for imposing strict liability,2 7 the final version left the development of the standard of liability
to the courts.2" Judicial creation of federal common law has imposed

strict, 29 joint and several,3 0 and retroactive liability31 upon responsible

discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing into the environment (including the abandonment or discarding of barrels, containers, and other closed receptacles
containing any hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant), but excludes (A) any
release which results in exposure to persons solely within a workplace, with respect to a
claim which such persons may assert against the employer of such persons, (B) emissions
from the engine exhaust of a motor vehicle, rolling stock, aircraft, vessel, or pipeline pumping station engine, (C) release of source, byproduct, or special nuclear material from a
nuclear incident, as those terms are defined in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, if such
release is subject to requirements with respect to financial protection established by the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission under section 170 of such Act, or, for the purposes of
section 9604 of this title or any other response action, any release of source byproduct, or
special nuclear material from any processing site designated under section 7912(a)(1) or
7942(a) of this title, and (D) the normal application of fertilizer.
Id (citations omitted).
25. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (1988). In defining the term "hazardous substance," CERCLA
incorporates by reference the substances designated as hazardous or toxic under the Clean Air Act,
the Clean Water Act, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, the Toxic Substances Act, and
the Solid Waste Disposal Act, and authorizes the EPA to designate additional substances that "may
present substantial danger to the public health or welfare or the environment." Id. See also New
York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1040 n.6 (2d Cir. 1985).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A) (1988).
27. "Congress intended that responsible parties be held strictly liable, even though an explicit
provision for strict liability was not included in the [final version]." New York v. Shore Realty
Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1042 (2d Cir. 1985) (referring to Steuart Transportation Co. v. Allied Towing
Corp., 596 F.2d 609, 613 (4th Cir. 1979)). 42 U.S.C. § 9601(32) (1982) provides that CERCLA
liability "shall be construed to be the standard of liability [under the Clean Water Act]." Courts
have interpreted liability under the Clean Water Act to be strict liability.). Congress understood that
the Clean Water Act imposed strict liability. H.R. Rep. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, 33,
reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 6119, 6136.
28. "As many courts have noted, a proposed requirement that joint and several liability be
imposed in all CERCLA cases was deleted from the final version of the bill." United States v.
Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 171 n.23 (4th Cir. 1988) (referring to United States v. Chem-Dyne
Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 806 (S.D. Ohio 1983)). Congress did not intend to reject joint and several
liability; rather, Congress intended to leave the standard of liability to develop under federal common law. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. at 808. See also United States v. A & F Materials Co.,
578 F. Supp. 1249, 1253 (S.D. I11. 1984) ("the floor debates on [CERCLA] ... suggest that the
deletion of joint and several language does not necessarily prevent imposition of a joint and several
standard by the courts").
29. See United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988); New York v. Shore
Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985); Versatile Metals, Inc. v. Union Corp., 693 F. Supp. 1563
(E.D. Pa. 1988); United States v. Bliss, 667 F. Supp. 1298 (E.D. Mo. 1987); United States v. Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp. 1053 (C.D. Cal. 1987); United States v. Dickerson, 640 F. Supp. 448 (D. Md.
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parties.
E. CERCLA's Scope of Liability
While there are four specific categories of PRP's enumerated under
CERCLA, courts have interpreted those categories to include various
parties.32 The EPA may seek reimbursement of Superfund expenditures
from four specific categories of PRPs: (1) the current owners or operators
of the property; (2) the owners or operators of the property at the time of
the contamination; (3) persons arranging for disposal or treatment at, or
transport of hazardous substances to, the property; and (4) persons who
selected sites and accepted hazardous substances for transport to those
sites.3 3 Judicial activism, supported by congressional amendment, broadened the scope of PRPs under CERCLA to explicitly include the most
1986); United States v. Liviola, 605 F. Supp. 96 (N.D. Ohio 1985); United States v. Northeastern
Pharmaceutical and Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 1984); United States v. Price, 577 F.
Supp. 1103 (D.NJ. 1983); In re T.P. Long Chem. Inc., 45 Bankr. 278 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985). "In
an effort to protect human health and the environment, two public policy goals are served by this
strict liability: cleanup of property contaminated by hazardous substances and deterrence of future
contamination." Frost, Strict Liability as an Incentive for Cleanup of ContaminatedProperty, 25
Hous. L. REV. 951, 951 (1988).
30. See Versatile Metals, Inc. v. Union Corp., 693 F. Supp. 1563 (E.D. Pa. 1988); Allied Corp.
v. Acme Solvents Reclaiming, Inc., 691 F. Supp. 1100 (N.D. Ill. 1988); United States v.
Northemaire Plating Co., 670 F. Supp. 742 (W.D. Mich. 1987); United States v. Bliss, 667 F. Supp.
1298 (E.D. Mo. 1987); United States v. Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp 1053 (C.D. Cal. 1987); Idaho v.
Bunker Hill Co., 635 F. Supp. 665 (D. Idaho 1986); Colorado v. Asarco, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 1484 (D.
Colo. 1985); United States v. Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. 1064 (D. Colo. 1985); United States v. A &
F Materials Co., Inc., 578 F. Supp. 1249 (S.D. Ill. 1984); United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326
(E.D. Pa. 1983).
31. See, eg., United States v. Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. 1064, 1072-73 (D. Colo. 1985) and
cases cited therein.
32. See Barr, supra note 4, at 941-47.
33. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988). The liability provision states:
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject only to the defenses
set forth in subsection (b) of this section (1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or
operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or
treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other party or entity, at any
facility or incineration vessel owned or operated by another party or entity and containing
such hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport to
disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected by such person, from
which there is a release, or a threatened release which causes the incurrence of response
costs, of a hazardous substance, shall be liable for (A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States Government or a State or an Indian tribe not inconsistent with the national contingency plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person consistent
with the national contingency plan;
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources, including
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previous owner or operator prior to a foreclosure by a state or local government. 34 Although Congress amended CERCLA to reflect this interpretation, it did not modify a related provision, the security interest

exemption, nor expressly address lender liability.35

F. Statutory Limitations to CERCLA Liability

Congress provided only four limitations to response cost liability
under CERCLA. The first three limitations are defenses to CERCLA
liability. The fourth limitation, the security interest exemption, negates
3
PRP status.

6

the reasonable costs of assessing such injury, destruction, or loss resulting from such a
release; and
(D) the costs of any health assessment or health effects study carried out under
section 9604(i) of this title.
Idl
34. See CERCLA, Pub. L. No 96-510, § 101(20)(A), 94 Stat. 2767, 2769 (1980) (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1982)). That section provided:
"owner or operator" means (i) in the case of a vessel, any person owning, operating, or
chartering by demise, such vessel, (ii) in the case of an onshore facility or an offshore
facility, any person owning or operating such facility, and (iii) in the case of any abandoned
facility, any person who owned, operated, or otherwise controlled activities at such facility
immediately prior to such abandonment. Such term does not include a person, who, without participating in the management of a vessel or facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect his security interest in the vessel or facility.
Id In 1986, SARA, Pub. L. No. 99-499, § 101(b)(2), 100 Stat. 1613, 1615 (1986) (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (iii) (1988)) amended Section 9601(20)(A)(iii) of the 1982 version to read:
(iii) in the case of any facility, tile or control of which was conveyed due to bankruptcy,
foreclosure, tax delinquency, abandonment, or similar means to a unit of State or local
government, any person who owned, operated, or otherwise controlled activities at such
facility immediately beforehand.
42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A)(iii) (1988).
35. It is clear that CERCLA, in its original form, did not explicitly intend to hold lenders liable
for clean-up costs. However, the court in United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp.
573 (D. Md. 1986), held that a lender could be liable for clean-up costs where the lender foreclosed
on contaminated property and purchased that property at the foreclosure sale. See infra notes 81-96
and accompanying text. This case was decided on April 9, 1986. SARA became law on October 17,
1986. Although the committee reports do not specifically mention Maryland Bank & Trust Co., by
amending § 9601(20)(A)(iii) to exclude governmental agencies that acquired title through foreclosure from the definition of "owner or operator," it appears that Congress intended to exempt from
liability only governmental agencies and no other foreclosure purchaser. Vollmann, Double Jeopardy: Lender Liability Under Superfund, 16 REAL EsT. L.L 3, 11 (1987), stipulates that:
Arguably, if a person other than a government agency acquires property by foreclosure,
then such person is an owner or operator just like the person who owned the property
immediately beforehand. By explicitly excluding any foreclosure purchaser that is a government agency from the definition of "owner or operator," Congress has, by implication
included all other foreclosure purchasers within the scope of the definition.

36. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A)(iii) (1988).
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1. The Three Statutory Defenses
Although the three statutory defenses are the exclusive defenses to
CERCLA liability,3" their application is limited to extreme circumstances. The first two defenses, an act of God 38 or an act of war,39 rarely
provide PRPs with protection from liability." The third defense4 1 is
similarly limited in application in that it requires proof by a preponderance of the evidence that:
37. See Kelley v. Thomas Solvent Co., 714 F. Supp. 1439, 144546 n.3 (W.D. Mich. 1989), and
cases cited therein.
38. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(1) (1988). An "act of God" is defined as "an unanticipated grave
natural disaster or other natural phenomenon of an exceptional, inevitable, and irresistible character,
the effects of which could not have been prevented or avoided by the exercise of due care or foresight." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(1) (1988). See also H.R. Rep. No. 1016, 96th Cong. 2d Sess., pt. 1, 32,
reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMiN. NEWS 6119, 6137.
39. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(2) (1988).
40. See ag., United States v. Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp. 1053, 1061 (C.D. Cal. 1987). There, the
court rejected the defendants' contention that heavy rainfall, as a natural disaster, constituted an act
of God. The court noted that:
the rains were not the kind of "exceptional" natural phenomena to which the narrow act of
God defense... applies. The rains were foreseeable based on normal climatic conditions
and any harm caused by the rain could have been prevented through design of proper
drainage channels. Furthermore, the rains were not the sole cause of the release.
Id. (emphasis in original).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1988) provides that:
There shall be no liability under subsection (a) of this section for a person otherwise liable
who can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the release or threat of release of
a hazardous substance and the damages resulting therefrom were caused solely by(1)...
(2) ...

(3) an act or omission of a third party other than an employee or agent of the defendant, or than one whose act or omission occurs in connection with a contractual relationship, existing directly or indirectly, with the defendant (except where the sole contractual
arrangement arises from a published tariff and acceptance for carriage by a common carrier by rail), if the defendant establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that (a) he
exercised due care with respect to the hazardous substance concerned, taking into consideration the characteristics of such hazardous substance, in light of all relevant facts and
circumstances, and (b) he took precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions of any
such third party and the consequences that could foreseeably result form such acts or
omissions; or
(4) any combination of the foregoing paragraphs.
Id. The third party defense has been appropriately termed an "ambiguous defense." Malloy, supra
note 1, at 68. Representative Curt Weldon has recently proposed H.R. 2787 to help clarify the third
party defense. This amendment would permit a defendant to establish a rebuttable presumption that
it has made an "all appropriate inquiry," as required by 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(B) (1988), if the
defendant obtained a "Phase I Environmental Audit" of the property to be purchased immediately
prior to or at the time of acquisition. H.R. 2787, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). A "Phase I Environmental Audit" is an investigation conducted by environmental professionals of the recorded chain of
title documents, any aerial photographs which might reflect prior uses of the property, any recorded
environmental cleanup liens, any reasonably obtainable government records of sites where there has
been a release of hazardous substances, and, finally, a visual inspection of the property and immediately adjacent properties. Id
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(1) a third party was the sole cause of the release of hazardous substances; (2) the third party was not an employee or agent of the defendant; (3) the acts or omissions of the third party did not occur in
connection with a direct or indirect contractual relationship to the [defendant]; and (4) the defendant exercised due care with respect to the
hazardous substances and took precautions against forseeable [sic] acts
and omissions of the third party.4 2
2.

The Security Interest Exemption

Although set forth in clear and uncompromising language, the security interest exemption has been difficult for courts to interpret. Section 9601(20)(A) 43 sets forth the security interest exemption to CERCLA
liability. The exemption negates PRP status if the PRP can show: (1) it
did not participate in the management of a facility; and (2) it holds "indicia of ownership" for the purpose of protecting a security interest in that
facility.' While the Act only requires satisfaction of two elements, the
language has caused inconsistent judicial interpretations. The scope of
liability under CERCLA, though drafted broadly, has been continuously
expanded by judicial activism and congressional amendments, a" leaving
the security interest exemption without meaning or effect.
III.

JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS: JUDICIAL ACTIVISM AND
LENDER LIABILITY.

Courts confronted with the issue of lender liability under CERCLA
have interpreted the security interest exemption inconsistently. As a result, there are varying degrees of protection for lenders depending upon
the jurisdiction. Three courts have specifically dealt with potential
lender liability; one court4 6 focused on current ownership while the two
42. United States v. Marisol, Inc., 725 F. Supp. 833, 838 (M.D. Pa. 1989) (citing Kelley v.
Thomas Solvent Co., 714 F. Supp. 1439 (W.D. Mich. 1989)).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1988) defines the term "owner or operator," but further provides

that "[s]uch term does not include a person, who, without participating in the management of a
vessel or facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect his security interest in the vessel or

facility." Id
44. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1988).
45. As a remedial statute, CERCLA "must be liberally interpreted in order to effectuate its

purposes." United States v. Moore, 698 F. Supp. 622, 626 (E.D. Va. 1988). See also Dedham water
Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d 1074, 1081 (lst Cir. 1986) ("CERCLA is essentially
a remedial statute designed by Congress to protect and preserve public health and the environment.
We are therefore obligated to construe its provisions liberally to avoid frustration of the beneficial

legislative purposes.") (referring to United States v. Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. 898, 902 (D.N.H. 1985)
(rev'd on other grounds, 889 F.2d 1146 (1st Cir. 1989)).

46. See United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986) supra
notes 81-96 and accompanying text.
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remaining courts concentrated on the lenders' involvement in the debtors' business. a7 In all three situations, the debtor, as owner of the land at
the time of the contamination, was liable under CERCLA.4" The courts
diverge when dealing with potential CERCLA liability of lending
institutions.
A. United States v. Mirabile
The first court to address lender liability under CERCLA concentrated on the lender's involvement in the debtor's business. In United
States v. Mirabile,49 the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania confronted the lender5" liability issue under CERCLA involving three different lenders. The court granted summary
judgment motions in favor of two defendants because their activities were
related to protecting financial interests.51 However, the court denied
summary judgment as to the third lender, placing great emphasis on the
question of whether the activities of the lender's officers constituted dayto-day participation in the debtor's business. 52
1. American Bank
American Bank loaned money to the owner-operator of a paint
manufacturing facility which later required CERCLA clean-up funds for
hazardous waste contamination. The loan was secured by a mortgage on
the manufacturer's real estate and equipment.53 Following the debtor's
default, American Bank foreclosed on the property and thereafter placed
the high bid at the foreclosure sale.54 Four months later, the bank assigned the high bid to Anna and Thomas Mirabile.5 5 After the Mirabiles
acquired title to the property, the EPA designated the facility as a hazardous waste site.5 6 The EPA removed the hazardous contamination
47. See United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990), infra notes 97-126
and accompanying text; United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,994 (Sept. 4,
1985), infra notes 49-80 and accompanying text.
48. This result was clearly intended by Congress and is not disputed in this Comment.
49. 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,992 (Sept. 4, 1985).
50. The court noted that its ruling was "limited to financial institutions which provide funds to
entities which dispose of hazardous wastes as a result of their business operations. It may be that a
different test would be appropriate for financers [sic] of entities whose sole business is that of hazardous waste disposal." Id. at 20,996 n.5.
51. Id. at 20,996-97.
52. Id. at 20,997.
53. Id. at 20,996.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
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and then filed suit to recover response costs. 5 7 The Mirabiles, as owners
of the property, were the original defendants named in the petition by the
United States." The Mirabiles joined American Bank and other lenders
as third-party defendants.5 9
The court granted American Bank's motion for summary judgment
on the basis of the security interest exemption.' The court noted that
the security interest exemption "plainly suggests that provided a secured
creditor does not become overly entangled in the affairs of the actual
owner or operator of a facility, the creditor may not be held liable for
cleanup costs." 61 American Bank's contention that it was not an
"owner" under CERCLA because the successful bid at the foreclosure
sale gave "only equitable title to the property which never evolved into
legal title" 62 was not addressed by the court because "[r]egardless of the
nature of the title received by [American Bank], its actions with respect
to the foreclosure were plainly undertaken in an effort to protect its security interest in the property."6 3 In ruling on American Bank's motion,
the court stated:
[t]he actions undertaken by [American Bank] with respect to the site
simply cannot be deemed to constitute participation in the management of the site.... [I]n enacting CERCLA[,] Congress manifested its
intent to impose liability upon those who were responsible for and
profited from improper disposal practices. Thus, it would appear that
before a secured creditor ... may be held liable, it must, at a minimum, participate in the day-to-day operational aspects of the site.6
The court concluded that American Bank's actions after foreclosure 65
were merely "prudent and routine steps to secure the property against
further depreciation,, 6 6 and, therefore granted American Bank's motion
for summary judgment.67
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.

20,993.
20,995.
20,996.
20,995.
20,996.

64. Id.
65. The court was referring to the fact that American Bank changed the locks, secured the
windows, showed the property to potential purchasers and inquired into clean-up costs. Id.

66. Id.
67. Id.
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2. The Small Business Administration
The court also granted summary judgment in favor of the second
lender, the Small Business Administration (SBA), on the basis of the security interest exemption, but without express reference to the exemption
language. The SBA loaned money to the same paint manufacturer, taking as security a pledge of stock and junior security interests in various
items of collateral, including real property.6 8 American Bank and the
third lender attempted to join the SBA as a third-party defendant on the
basis of the SBA's loan provisions which contemplated managerial involvement.6 9 Notwithstanding the contract provisions, the court concluded that the SBA had not, in fact, provided managerial assistance to
the debtor.70 Despite the court's determination, the defendants alternatively argued that the SBA was liable because the SBA's loan restrictions
could have prevented the debtor from disposing of the hazardous substances.7 1 The court rejected this contention, finding that nothing in
CERCLA required lenders to ensure that loan proceeds were applied to
clean up hazardous wastes.72
In granting the SBA's motion for summary judgment on the issue of
liability, the court stated that a lender's participation in "purely financial
aspects of operation[s]" 73 is not sufficient to result in CERCLA liability.7 4 Although the court's final determination .was not expressly
couched in terms of the security interest exemption, the court negated
the lender's PRP status by the fact that the lender's involvement was
purely financial. 75
3. Mellon Bank
In denying the third lender's motion for summary judgment, the
court, without refering to the security interest exemption, focused on the
fact that the lender had participated in the paint manufacturer's business
through the activities of two loan officers. One loan officer served on the
68. Ile It is important to note that the SBA never held legal or equitable title to the property.
Id. at 20,997. Therefore, any determinations by the court regarding the lender's liability were based
on the lenders involvement in the debtor's business and not on the basis of current or past
ownership.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Ia
72. Ia
73. Id
74. Id.
75. Id
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debtor's advisory board and another loan officer controlled the debtor's
post-bankruptcy activities.76 The court was concerned with the activities
of the loan officer who controlled the debtor's post-bankruptcy activities.7 7 This officer participated in the debtor's business by "monitoring
the cash collateral accounts, ensuring that receivables went to the proper
account, and establishing a reporting system between the company and
the bank." Furthermore, the officer visited the manufacturing plant almost weekly, determined the priority of filling orders, "and insisted on
certain manufacturing changes and reassignment of personnel." 7 8
The court determined that Mellon Bank's active participation
presented "a genuine issue of [material] fact as to whether Mellon Bank
...
engaged in the sort of participation in management which would
bring a secured creditor within the scope of CERCLA liability," and denied Mellon Bank's motion for summary judgment without reference to
the security interest exemption.7 9 Remaining unanswered by the
Mirabile decision is the degree to which a lender may participate in a
debtor's business "primarily to protect"8 0 a security interest without incurring CERCLA liability.
B.

United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co.

An occasion to settle the question left unanswered by Mirabile was
later presented to a different court. However, the court in United States
v. MarylandBank & Trust Co.8" bypassed the opportunity and denied the
lender's summary judgment motion on the basis of current ownership.
In so ruling, the court completely skirted the question regarding the degree of participation permitted under CERCLA and enabled the lender
liability issue to proceed to trial on the basis of "current ownership"
alone.
76. Id. Deposition testimony revealed that loan officer Brett Sauers gave general financial advice but did not discuss production or waste disposal. Id Further testimony concerning the actions

of Mellon Bank's predecessor in interest, Girard Bank, indicated that the paint manufacturer

"would have to accept the day-to-day supervision" provided by Girard if the manufacturer "wanted
to continue operations with Girard funds." Id Using the actions of Mellon Bank's predecessor in

interest as a basis for liability raises the issue of secondary secondary liability. Such extended liability may hinder the transferability of notes secured by real property in the secondary mortgage mar-

ket. Comment, The Impact of the 1986 Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act on the
Commercial Lending Industry: A CriticalAssessment, 41 U. MIAMI L. REv. 879, 901 (1987).
77. 15 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20,997.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1988).
81. 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986).
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In MarylandBank & Trust Co., the lender acquired title to contaminated property through a lending transaction whereby the bank had
loaned money to finance the purchase of property on which a garbage
business operated.82 While the record revealed that the bank knew a
trash and garbage business operated on the property, no evidence established when the bank became aware of this fact.8 3 After the debtor defaulted, Maryland Bank foreclosed on its security interest and purchased
the property at the foreclosure sale.84 Approximately one year later, the
debtor notified the county Director of Environmental Hygiene of the
hazardous contamination on the property.85 The EPA instigated cleanup procedures and then sued the bank to recover its response costs.86
The court denied the Bank's motion for summary judgment based
on a narrow interpretation of the security interest exemption. Maryland
Bank argued that it should be entitled to the benefit of the security interest exemption because the bank acquired ownership of the hazardous
waste site through foreclosure on its security interest.8 7 Interpreting the
exemption narrowly, the court stated that the exemption applies only to
"those persons who, at the time of the clean-up, hold indicia of ownership to protect a then-held security interest in the land."88 The court
determined that Maryland Bank "purchased the property at the foreclosure sale not to protect its security interest, but to protect its investment."8 9 Making a distinction between common law title theory
mortgage and lien theory mortgage jurisdictions,90 the court concluded
that "Congress intended by this exception to exclude [only] these common law title mortgagees from the definition of 'owner' since title was in
82. Id. at 573. It was not clear if the hazardous wastes were located near the landfill so as to
provide notice to the bank.

83. Id. at 575.
84. Id. Nothing in the court's opinion attempted to explain why Maryland Bank purchased the
property for $381,500 when the mortgage was for $335,000. Likewise, there was no indication as to
why the bank held title to the property for an extended amount of time.
85. Id
86. Id at 575-76.
87. Id at 579.
88. Id. (emphasis added).
89. Id When a lender forecloses on a security interest, it is protecting a security interest and an
investment; that is the business of lenders.
90. Id. In a title theory jurisdiction, as in Maryland, upon "executing a mortgage, the mortgagor passes title to the property to the mortgagee." When the mortgagor completes payments, title to
the property reverts back to the mortgagor. I. WEICH, REAL ESTATE 103 (1967). However, in a
lien theory jurisdiction, the mortgage placed on the property constitutes a lien in favor of the mortgagee, but title to the property remains with the mortgagor. Id at 104.
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their hands only by operation of the common law."91 The court supported its interpretation by discussing weak portions of the Act's legisla-

tive history, 92focusing mainly on sections referring to ownership

requirements.
In granting the government's motion for partial summary judgment

on the issue of liability against the lender, the court focused on current
ownership alone and in so doing essentially rewrote CERCLA. The
court noted that any dispute over the term "operator" as used in CERCLA was irrelevant because "current ownership of a facility alone"
would support holding the lender liable. 93 The court maintained that
because Maryland Bank had held title to the property for an extended

duration, the court did not need to consider whether a lender that
purchased the property at a foreclosure sale and then "promptly resold"
that property, would be liable as an "owner or operator" under CERCLA.9 4 By focusing on the length of time that the lender held the property, the court essentially rewrote CERCLA to provide a non-specific

time limitation upon which a secured party may hold title to foreclosed,
91. 632 F. Supp. at 579. In rejecting a broader interpretation of the security interest exemption,
the court expressly disagreed with the court in United States v. Mirabile,see supra notes 49-80 and
accompanying text. Id at 580.
92. The court referred to the language of the first draft of the Comprehensive Oil Pollution
Liability and Compensation Act, H.R. 85, which was "one of the four major bills out of which
CERCLA emerged." Id at 579. Part of that act defined "owner." Although the definition of owner
is not at all like the definition provided by CERCLA as enacted, the definition has a substantially
similar security interest exemption. Id The court also referred to House Report 96-172, which
accompanied H.R. 85, which provided that:
[The term "owner"] does not include certain persons possessing indicia of ownership (such
as a financial institution) who, without participating in the management or operation of a
vessel or facility, hold title either in order to secure a loan or in connection with a lease
financing arrangement under the appropriate banking laws, rules or regulations.
Id at 579-80 (quoting House Report 96-172) (emphasis by court). The court concluded, therefore,
that "Congress intended to protect banks that hold mortgages in jurisdictions governed by the common law of mortgages, and not all mortgagees who later acquire title." Id. at 580. However, Congress did not intend such a narrow reading of the security interest exemption. Congress could have
expressly limited the scope of the security interest exemption but, either as a result of shoddy drafting or mere oversight, Congress failed to do so. If Congress truly intended to permit application of
the security interest exemption only to lenders in title theory jurisdictions, then Congress must explicitly provide such a limitation. A broader security interest exemption is more realistic considering
the normal course of business activities of lenders.
93. Id. at 577. Implicit in the court's action of summarily dismissing the dispute over the
definition of the term "operator" is the holding that once "current ownership" is established, consideration need not be given to degrees of management, participation, or control.
94. Id. at 579 n.5 (emphasis added). Lenders may be deterred from foreclosing to proZect their
interest because the length of time it takes to resell property is uncertain. If the property is known to
be contaminated then the length of time may be even greater.
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contaminated property and still be exempted from liability under the security interest exemption.9" In so ruling, the court declined to address

the degree of participation required for CERCLA liability thereby increasing the uncertainty facing lenders. 96 The court in Maryland Bank
& Trust Co. left more questions unanswered than it resolved.
C. United States v. Fleet Factors Corp.
In United States v. Fleet Factors Corp.,97 the lender faced potential

CERCLA liability, not because it foreclosed on real property, but rather
because the lender allegedly participated in the management and control
of the facility. The lender entered into an agreement9 in which it advanced funds to the debtor, a cloth printing facility, against the assignment of the debtor's accounts receivable. 99 The agreement between the

lender and the debtor continued until shortly before the debtor ceased
operations,"° after which time the lender began attempts to liquidate its

security interest. 0 1 Following the debtor's default, the lender foreclosed
on part of the debtor's equipment and inventory, but never foreclosed on

the real property. 102 The lender contracted with an auctioneer to conduct a public auction to sell the manufacturer's remaining inventory and
equipment. 10 3 Removal of the inventory and equipment purchased at the
auction was the responsibility of the purchasers." a After the auction,
the lender contracted with a third party to remove the remaining equip-

ment with instructions to leave the premises "broom clean."' 015 After the
EPA determined the property to be a hazardous waste site, the EPA
cleaned up the site and then fied suit against Fleet and several other
95. When drafting the security interest exemption, Congress undoubtedly knew the standard
practice employed by lending institutions in foreclosing on security interests "primarily for the purpose of protecting" those interests.
96. This left lenders asking how long a lender is permitted to hold title and still be deemed to
have "promptly resold" the property.
97. 901 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990).
98. This agreement permitted Fleet to check the credit of the debtor's customers before the
debtor was allowed to ship the goods to its customers. United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 724 F.
Supp. 955, 958 (S.D. Ga. 1988).
99. Fleet, 901 F.2d at 1552. As further collateral, Fleet received a security interest in the debtors "textile facility and all of its equipment, inventory, and fixtures." Id.
100. Id. The debtor filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy before Fleet cancelled the agreement, but
the court approved the agreement between the creditor and the debtor. Id.
101. Id
102. Id In fact, the property was conveyed to Emanuel County, Georgia at a foreclosure sale
due to the debtor's failure to pay taxes. Id at 1553.
103. Id. at 1552.
104. Id at 1552-53.
105. Id at 1553.
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defendants. 10 6 The District Court for the Southern District of Georgia
denied Fleet's motion for summary judgment on grounds that there were
issues of material fact regarding Fleet's involvement in the management
of the facility. 7 Insecure with its interpretation of CERCLA, the district court certified its decision as appropriate for interlocutory appeal. 10 8
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals denied Fleet's
motion for summary judgment and attempted to clarify the ambiguous
security interest exemption." ° In interpreting the security interest exemption, the court of appeals rejected the government's proposed "narrow and strictly literal interpretation."'
Likewise, the court rejected
the interpretation of the security interest exemption adopted by the court
in United States v. Mirabilelt1 because that interpretation was deemed
' 12
"too permissive."
Rather, the court of appeals ruled that a secured creditor incurs
CERCLA liability "by participating in the financial management of a
facility to a degree indicating a capacity to influence the corporation's
106. Id. at 1553. It cost the EPA over $400,000 to remove 700 fifty-five gallon drums of toxic
chemicals and forty-four truck loads of asbestos contaminated material. Id.
107. United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 724 F. Supp. 955, 958 (S.D. Ga. 1988).
108. Id. at 962. The reasons given for granting the certification were:
[Tlhis order disposes of controlling questions of law concerning which there is substantial
doubt including, but not limited to, [the] construction of CERCLA's definition of "owner
and operator" and the secured lender exemption contained in that definition; [the] construction of the CERCLA provisions describing the classes of liable persons; and [the]
construction of the scope of the third-party defense to CERCLA liability.
Id. at 962 (emphasis added).
109. United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1552 (11th Cir. 1990).
110. Id at 1556. The court declined to accept
the government's suggestion because it would largely eviscerate the exemption Congress
intended to afford to secured creditors. Secured lenders frequently have some involvement
in the financial affairs of their debtors in order to insure that their interests are being adequately protected. To adopt the government's interpretation of the secured creditor exemption could expose all such lenders to CERCLA liability for engaging in their normal
course of business.
Id. This statement is clearly within the general rule of statutory construction that a court should
interpret a statute to give effect to all of its provisions. Unfortunately, the court, in its ultimate
holding, essentially provides an interpretation which destroys all possible application of the security
interest exemption.
111. 15 Envt'l L. Rep. (Envt'l L. Inst.) 20,992 (Sept. 4, 1985). See also notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
112. Fleet, 901 F.2d at 1558. The Court ruled that ambiguous terms within CERCLA "should
be construed to favor liability" since CERCLA has an overwhelming remedial goal. Id. at 1557
(citing Florida Power & Light Co. v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 893 F.2d 1313, 1317 (11th Cir. 1990).
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treatment of hazardous wastes."1' 13 However, the court failed to adequately delineate the boundaries of the "degree" of participation permitted.114 Interpreting the security interest narrowly, the court determined
that a lender would be liable if its participation in the management of a
facility was broad enough to support an inference that the lender "could
affect hazardous waste disposal decisions if it so chose." '
The court
theorized that this interpretation would give creditors latitude to deal
with debtors up to the point of permitting a lender to monitor all aspects
of the debtor's business if necessary, without being exposed to potential
liability. 116 Finally, the court stated that a lender could "become involved in occasional and discrete financial decisions" in order to protect
its security interest without incurring CERCLA liability. 1 7 Unfortunately, the court failed to explain the phrase "occasional and discrete
financial decisions." Without clarification, lenders have no way of ascertaining which of their normal course of business activities are permissible
and which will result in CERCLA liability.
The court defended its ruling by noting that its interpretation would
encourage lenders to investigate waste treatment practices of potential
debtors, which would, in turn, persuade debtors to practice more responsible disposal practices.'
The court believed its judgment would induce
lenders to weigh the risks of CERCLA liability into the terms of loan
agreements, thereby "incur[ing] no greater risk[s] than they bargained
for."' 1 9 Changes in loan agreements would in turn persuade debtors "to
improve their handling of hazardous wastes." 1 0 While these are desirable results, they are not the express nor implied objectives of CERCLA.12 1 The court's interpretation of the security interest exemption
amounts to nothing more than pure judicial activism. More specifically,
113. Id. (emphasis added).
114. Id The Court briefly attempted to define that degree by noting that:
It is not necessary for the secured creditor actually to involve itself in the day-to-day operations of the facility in order to be liable-although such conduct will certainly lead to the
loss of the protection of the statutory exemption. Nor is it necessary for the secured creditor to participate in management decisions relating to hazardous waste.

Id at 1557-58.
115. Id at 1558. This language further demonstrates the confusion that has resulted from judicial attempts at interpreting the ambiguous CERCLA.
116. Id

117. Id
118. Id

119. Id
120. Id.
121. See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
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the court rewrote CERCLA and in so doing acted as a legislator.12 2
The court denied Fleet's motion for summary judgment because of
Fleet's pervasive involvement with the debtor's business.123 Fleet exerted
control over the debtor in a number of ways:
Fleet required [the debtor] to seek its approval before shipping its
goods to customers, established the price for excess inventory, dictated
when and to whom the finished goods should be shipped, determined
when employees should be laid off, supervised the activity of the office
administrator at the site, received and processed [the debtor's] employment tax forms, controlled access to the facility, and contracted with
[the auctioneer]
to dispose of the fixtures and equipment at [the
124
facility].

It was these facts that, if proved, would be "sufficient to remove" the
lender from the protection of the security interest exemption,12 because
the lender's participation in the management of the debtor's business
would be deemed "pervasive." 126
D. May Lenders Rely on the Security Interest Exemption?
Following the judicial interpretations of the security interest exemption, it is unclear whether lenders have any protection under CERCLA.
122. The court concluded that the increased awareness of CERCLA liability would encourage
creditors to "monitor hazardous waste treatment systems and policies of their debtors and insist
upon compliance with acceptable treatment standards." Id. The court in Fleetrewrote CERCLA so
as to convert lenders into environmental inspectors. If this were Congress' intent, surely Congress
would have more clearly reflected that goal in CERCLA.
123. Id at 1559. The court refused to grant the defendant's motion for summary judgment
because it was unsure whether Fleet's activities constituted "operating" under 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(20)(A)(i) (1988), which defines an "owner or operator," in part, as "any person owning,
operating,or chartering by demise." Id (emphasis added). Obviously, Fleet's actions do not constitute "participation in the management." Fleet engaged in these actions in an effort to liquidate the
remaining assets of the facility. Liability should not be imposed under these circumstances. However, Fleet should have a duty to select responsible parties in requesting normal clean-up services. It
appears that "participation in the management of the facility" would include some form of management of the facility while operating as a business and not while liquidating its assets.
124. Fleet, 901 F.2d at 1559.
125. Id
126. Id The court noted that:
[g]enerally, the lender's capacity to influence a debtor facility's treatment of hazardous
waste will be inferred from the extent of its involvement in the facility's financial management. Here, that inference is not even necessary because there was evidence before the
district court that Fleet actively asserted its control over the disposal of hazardous wastes
at the site by prohibiting [the debtor] from selling several barrels of chemicals to potential
buyers. As a result, the barrels remained at the facility unattended until the EPA acted to
remove the contaminants.
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Courts have placed varying interpretations on the security interest exemption,' 2 7 leading to inconsistent conclusions and uncertainties concerning the exemption's availability. Although the court in Mirabileread
the security interest exemption broadly, suggesting that a lender should
only be liable if it participates in the day-to-day management of the
debtor's business,12 the court failed to provide lenders with adequate

guidance. On the other hand, the court in MarylandBank & Trust Co.
construed the exemption so narrowly that it would apply only where the
lender holds indicia of ownership to protect a "then-held security interest,"'12 9 thereby making the exemption inapplicable when a lender has
foreclosed on property to protect a security interest. In so doing, the

MarylandBank & Trust Co. court misinterpreted Congressional intent130
by preventing foreclosing lenders from ever claiming the security interest
exemption. Finally, the court in Fleet not only failed to adequately delineate the boundaries of its narrow interpretation but, in so doing, made

the security interest exemption in CERCLA mere excess language. This
clearly violates the well known maxim of statutory construction "that all
words and provisions of statutes are intended to have meaning and are to

be given effect, and words of a statute are not to be construed as surplusage."

131

IV.

THE NEED FOR REEXAMINATION OF LENDER LIABILITY

Analysis of the case law reveals that courts have developed a gloss

on a vague and poorly drafted statute. 132 All three courts engaged in an
127. See supra notes 4648 and accompanying text.
128. See United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20,995 (the "exemption plainly suggests
that provided a secured creditor does not become overly entangled in the affairs of the actual owner
or operator of a facility, the creditor may not be held liable for cleanup costs."). See supranotes 4980 and accompanying text.
129. 632 F. Supp. at 579 (emphasis added). The exemption would apply only in jurisdictions
which follow the title theory of mortgages. See supra note 92. A majority of states have overridden
the title theory of mortgages through statutory enactment. G. Osborne, G. Nelson & D. Whitman,
Real Estate Finance Law § 4.2 (1979). At the time of the MarylandBank & Trust Co. decision,
there were only thirteen jurisdictions which still followed the title theory. 632 F. Supp. at 579.
Therefore, the exemption would apply only to a minority of jurisdictions.
130. In enacting CERCLA, Congress intended to hold liable those who were responsible for the
contamination and those who benefited from the industry which caused the hazardous waste problem. See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
131. Wilderness Society v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842, 856 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (citing McDonald v.
Thompson, 305 U.S. 263, 266 (1938)).
132. Blame must also be placed upon Congress. See Tanglewood East Homeowners v. CharlesThomas, Inc., 849 F.2d 1568, 1572 (5th Cir. 1988) ("Although [CERCLA] was enacted in the waning hours of the 96th Congress, and as the product of apparent legislative compromise [it] is not a
model of clarity..
"); Artesian Water Co. v. Government of New Castle County, 659 F. Supp.
1269, 1277 (D. Del. 1987) ("Because CERCLA as finally enacted was the product of an unusually
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extensive exchange of adjectives with no supporting analysis when confronted with the issues of whether a lender is an "owner or operator" as
defined in CERCLA and the degree to which a lender may actively participate in management and control to protect its security interest but
still fall within the ambit of the security interest exemption. The courts,
in their attempts to resolve the issues, generate more questions than they
answer.
Imposing liability on lenders-turned-owners creates problems and
economic ramifications that do not arise when other landowners are held
liable. 3 For example, "[w]hen an increase in the cost of capital results
in a decline in the demand for capital, economic growth may be stymied
by the subsequent decline in investment." 134 This, in turn, generally
leads to a reduction in the construction industries, a reduction in new
economic growth, a decrease in employment, and a decline in consumer
spending.13 5 Although an increase in transaction costs alone will not
lead to a recession, its economic consequences affect all levels of
36

society.1

Faced with potential CERCLA liability, lenders have begun to take
additional precautionary measures designed to lead to the discovery of
hazardous waste including conducting environmental audits, policing
debtors' current usage, and investigating the history of usage of the facility. 37 As a result, lenders pass the costs of precautionary measures on to
debtors in the form of increased interest rates and transaction costs. 138
In the future, lenders may go so far as to abandon security interests to
avoid CERCLA liability. 1 39 Lenders may also be unwilling to collateralize land as they become leery of potential liability. Considering the ripple effects" ° lender liability may have on the banking community and the
arduous process of political compromise, it is hardly a model of concise legislative draftsmanship.")
(footnote omitted); United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103, 1109 (D.N.J. 1983) ("[CERCLA] was
hastily, and, therefore, inadequately drafted.... Because of the haste with which CERCLA was
enacted, Congress was not able to provide a clarifying committee report, thereby making it extremely difficult to pinpoint the intended scope of the legislation.").
133. Comment, supra note 76, at 899-900.
134. Comment, supra note 76, at 900.
135. Comment, supra note 76, at 900.
136. Comment, supra note 76, at 900.
137. Comment, supra note 76, at 899.
138. Comment, supra note 76, at 900.
139. This appears to have been the situation in United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d
1550 (1 th Cir. 1990), see supra notes 97-126 and accompanying text, wherein the lender, although it
had a security interest in the property, foreclosed only on security interests relating to equipment.
140. "Like most legislative remedies, CERCLA is not a perfect solution to the hazardous waste
problem. The Act has created as many problems as it has resolved. In an effort to protect the
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entire economy, Congress needs to respond promptly.
The uncertainties that have been cast upon lenders by judicial inter-

pretations of the security interest exemption create a need for Congress
to adopt legislation which specifically confronts and clarifies the ques-

tions raised by judicial attempts at interpreting CERCLA, the security
interest exemption, and lender liability.
A.

A Recent Attempt at Refonm H.R. 2085

Representative John J. LaFalce recently attempted to clarify the
ambiguities created by the courts by proposing an amendment to exempt
lenders from CERCLA liability. LaFalce's amendment,' 4 1 now before
the Committee on Energy and Commerce, provides a blanket exemption

from CERCLA liability for any "commercial lending institution which
acquires ownership or control of a property to realize on a security interest held by the person in that property." 142
While LaFalce's amendment attempts to correct the inconsistent ju-

dicial interpretations, it is inadequate in many respects. Not only does it
fail to make important distinctions between situations where liability
should and should not arise, it is not in accordance with the policies of
CERCLA. 14 3 In enacting CERCLA, Congress intended to hold liable
those parties who benefit from hazardous waste contamination. A lender
enters into a loan transaction to make money. Generally, hazardous
waste contamination is neither a direct nor an indirect result of a loan
[Superfund] from depletion, the EPA's enforcement of CERCLA has deleteriously affected real estate and commercial transactions." Glass, Superfund and SARA: Are There Any Defenses Left?, 12
HARV. ENvnL. L. REv. 385, 386 (1988). CERCLA liability has also reached shareholders and
parent corporations. See New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1052 (2d Cir. 1985) (The
owner and stockholder of the defendant corporation was held "liable as an 'operator' under CERCLA for the State's response costs.") (citation omitted). See also Vermont v. Staco, Inc., 684 F.
Supp. 822 (D. Vt. 1988).
141. H.R. 2085, 101st Cong. 1st Sess. (1989). The EPA is currently considering a proposal
which absolves lenders of CERCLA liability provided the lender sells the contaminated property
within six months. Wall Street J., Oct. 10, 1990, at B6, col. 1.
142. H.R. 2085, 101st Cong. 1st Sess. § l(a)(1)(A)(i) (1989). This bill was introduced and referred to the Committee on Energy and Commerce on April 25, 1989. No further action has taken
place on this bill as of yet. Another bill, H.R. 2787, introduced by Representative Curt Weldon,
attempts to define the parameters of an "all appropriate inquiry," as required under 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(35)(B) (1988), in order to qualify for the 'innocent landowner' defense. H.R. 2787, 101st
Cong. 1st Sess. (1989).
143. The purpose behind CERCLA was to assure "that those who benefit[ed] financially from a
commercial activity internalize the health and environmental costs of that activity into the costs of
doing business." S. Rep. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 13 (1980). See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text. Overall, the legislation was designed to provide funding for the clean-up costs. While
there are certain instances where lending institutions should not be held liable, there are, likewise,
circumstances where CERCLA liability should be imposed on lenders.
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transaction, but rather, is due to careless disposal practices by debtors.
However, situations may arise where the lender's activities directly cause
the hazard3us waste contamination. A blanket exemption fails to distinguish between situations where a lender should and should not be held
liable.
Congress must strike a balance taking into account CERCLA policies, economic realities, and human health and welfare concerns. There
are certain costs and risks that a lender expects to assume when engaging
in lending practices which are similar to property management activities.
Completely absolving lending institutions from CERCLA liability permits careless practices by a commercial community which must take responsibility to deter the continued degradation of the environment.
Conversely, the adverse effects created by holding lenders liable without
exception are similarly devastating.144 Accordingly, the security interest
exemption must provide protection so as to avoid the deputization of
lenders as environmental monitors. 145 Adopting legislation which balances the numerous interests will further the interests of all parties
involved.
B. A ProposedSolution
Congress needs to amend CERCLA to redefine the scope of the security interest exemption, to confront the inconsistent judicial interpretations of CERCLA, and to detail obligations and responsibilities of
lenders. To afford lenders adequate protection, provisions are needed
which permit lenders to foreclose on security interests, specify pre-lending duties, set out the duties of lenders regarding discoveries of hazardous waste, and allow lenders to give financial assistance. In order to
permit lending institutions to protect security interests through reasonable measures and not face the extreme costs of clean-up, an amendment
to CERCLA must contain provisions that:
redefine the scope of the security interest exemption to permit
foreclosures, regardless of the mortgage theory of that particular
jurisdiction;
- permit the lender to foreclose on contaminated property and have
a "controller"
appointed to properly liquidate the debtor's
14 6
assets;

144. Such carefree lending practices include willful blindness of environmental problems, which
is clearly undesirable in all respects.
145. Comment, supra note 76, at 901.
146. "Controller," as used here, is intended to be analogous to a "receiver" appointed pursuant
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specify a duty on lenders to report discoveries of potential or actual contamination;
specify pre-lending duties of lenders;
permit a lender to provide managerial assistance without risking
exorbitant liability unless the assistance rises to the level of dayto-day participation or directly causes the hazardous waste contamination; and
permit lenders to hold title to foreclosed property for a reasonable
amount of time, determined by considerations of the economics of
the locality and the condition of the property.

-

-

1. Lenders Should be Allowed to Continue the Practice of
Foreclosing on Security Interests
Due to the courts' vague and inconsistent interpretations, legislation
is necessary to specifically grant secured creditors the right to foreclose
on security interests without incurring CERCLA liability and without a

need to consider the mortgage theory of the appropriate jurisdiction.
The financial community must know its rights in order to effectively deal
with debtors. Broadening the scope of the security interest exemption to
apply to lenders who foreclose on contaminated property will enable

lenders to properly maintain their security interests while avoiding the
ripple effects caused by lender liability.147

2.

Appointment of a "Controller" to Protect the Environmental
Interest

Provisions permitting a lender to foreclose on a facility and appoint

a "controller" to conduct expedient liquidation operations will protect
the environment and enable lenders to protect security interests. This
action is particularly necessary where the debtor is deliberately squander-

ing the assets of the business.

48

The "controller" concept could be ex-

plicitly set forth in the mortgage or security agreement, or could arise
to state corporation statutes when the corporation is operated to the detriment of shareholders or
creditors. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 226(a)(2) (1983). Of course, this should be limited to
extrme situations. It may be appropriate, for example, where the debtor is deliberately squandering
the business' assets. Liquidation would have to begin immediately after the "controller" is appointed so as to prevent unscrupulous lenders who would have a "controller" run a business for an
extended amount of time under the guise of preparing to liquidate.
147. See supra notes 133-140 and accompanying text.
148. A debtor may squander the business assets upon discovery of potential CERCLA liability.
Because hazardous waste clean-up costs can be exorbitant, see supra note 2, the debtor would desire
to liquidate the assets prior to any action by the United States.
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from equitable principles of common law or pursuant to statutory provisions. Likewise, the provision must enable the lender to contribute management advice and instruction where the debtor, due to lack of capital
or revenues, is unable to meet its financial obligations. So long as any
advice provided does not rise to day-to-day participation or directly
cause the contamination, the lender should be exempted from liability.
3.

Lenders' Duties to Report Discoveries

New legislation must govern actions of a lending institution which
has foreclosed on property and thereafter discovered that the property
contains hazardous waste. For example, a lender must be required to
report immediately the discovery to the EPA, but at the same time be
permitted to fie a lien on the property. If the government designates the
site as a Superfund site, any lien fied by the lender would still be
subordinate to the federal lien in favor of the United States. 149 The
lender's lien would then permit the lender to recoup any losses after the
government has been compensated. In the end the lender, if an innocent
and passive bystander, would not incur CERCLA clean-up costs.
4.

Specific Pre-Lending Duties

Provisions that delineate specific duties of lending institutions prior
to accepting security interests in real property will help clarify the ambiguities caused by the inconsistent judicial interpretations. Requirements
could include environmental audits, soil sampling, site inspections, and
historical reviews.15 Of course, Congress must not transform lenders
into EPA deputies. The exemption must, however, be negated where a
lender accepts a security interest in property and knew or should have
149. 42 U.S.C. § 9607I)(1) (1988) provides in pertinent part that "[a]ll costs and damages for

which a person is liable to the United States under [CERCLA] ... shall constitute a lien in favor of
the United States upon all real property and rights to such property which - (A) belong to such
person; and (B) are subject to or affected by a removal or remedial action." Id. The language creates

a lien:
in favor of the United States for the value of improvements to real property resulting from

a response action. Response actions may cause substantial increases in the value of the

land on which these actions are taken. Thus, the purpose of these liens is to ensure that the
owners of the property where a clean-up has occurred will not receive a windfall profit as a
result of the clean-up.
H.R. REP. No. 253, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 17, reprintedin 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 3038, 3040. For the duration and enforceability of this federal lien, see 42 U.S.C. § 9607

(1)(2)-(4) (1988).
150. See supra note 41.
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known that the debtor either handled hazardous wastes or was likely to
handle hazardous wastes as an integral part of the debtor's business.
5.

Managerial Assistance

Congress needs to specify the degree to which lenders are permitted
to participate in a debtor's business without facing CERCLA liability.
Legislation delineating which activities would result in liability and
which activities would not is needed to stabilize the inconsistencies created by the divergent judicial interpretations. Only then will lenders
have the option to focus on lending activities without the constant concern of CERCLA liability.
6.

Holding Title to Foreclosed Property

New legislation should contain a provision which enables lenders to
hold title to foreclosed property for a reasonable amount of time. The
duration should depend upon the economics of the geographic area and
the condition of the property. For example, property which is severely
contaminated would clearly require additional time for the lender to find
a willing buyer. Such a provision would enable lenders to foreclose on
property without fear of facing automatic CERCLA liability on the basis
of current ownership alone.15 1
C. A Callfor CongressionalAction
Congress must enact legislation which deals equitably and specifically with lender liability under CERCLA. Any legislation enacted cannot, like LaFalce's amendment, completely exonerate lenders from
liability without inquiring into potential causation. Lenders should be
responsible for response costs when the lender's participation in the
debtor's business causes the hazardous contamination. However, when
the lender's relation to the contaminated property is transitory, no liability should follow.
V.

TESTING THE PROPOSED SOLUTION AND LAFALCE'S SOLUTION

Testing each proposed solution demonstrates the inadequacies of
LaFalce's amendment and further demonstrates the need for Congressional clarification. Each hypothetical below assumes that the lender has
151. See supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text.
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a security interest in real property which either has or will become subject to CERCLA clean-up proceedings by the EPA. LaFalce's amendment, which provides a blanket exemption, would produce exactly the
same result under each hypothetical. Congress, however, did not intend
to completely absolve lenders from liability.'5 2 There are instances, as
shown below, where holding a lender liable under CERCLA furthers the
purposes of the Act without completely ambushing the financial
community.
A.

The Lender as an "Owner" under CERCLA
1. Hypothetical One

A transitory relationship with contaminated property should not be
a basis for lender liability under CERCLA. Hypothetical one involves a
situation where a lender forecloses on a security interest, purchases the
property at the foreclosure sale, and thereafter resells that property.153
Under these circumstances, the author's proposal and LaFalce's amendment produce identical results. The transitory relationship of the lender
would not lead to liability. Generally, this is the desired result as lenders
should not be responsible for contamination they did not create. Failing
to hold a lender liable on the basis of a transitory relationship to a hazardous waste site will further the interests of all parties involved. Lenders' interests are furthered because they can execute on a security
agreement without risking exorbitant liability. Accordingly, lenders will
not be discouraged from providing loans and accepting security interests
in real estate thereby furthering the interests of property owners as well.
To protect a security interest, a lender is likely to either clean up a
hazardous waste site before selling the property or sell the property, discounted proportionately to reflect clean-up costs."5 4 Therefore, the
152. See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
153. This is a fairly common scenario. It is the common procedure utilized by lending institutions when dealing with secured interests where the debtor defaults. This hypothetical is based upon
American Bank's situation presented to the court in Mirabile. See supra notes 49-80 and accompanying text.
154. The lender, or any other potentially responsible party, will be liable if it fails to disclose
information regarding hazardous waste to potential buyers. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(C) (1988).
[I]f
the defendant [in a response action] obtained actual knowledge of the release or
threatened release of a hazardous substance at such facility when the defendant owned the
real property and then subsequently transferred ownership of the property to another person without disclosing such knowledge, such defendant shall be treated as liable under
section 9607(a)(1) of this title and no defense under section 9607(b)(3) of this title shall be
available to such defendant.
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lender will have already suffered a loss due to the contamination. Holding a lender additionally liable under these circumstances will cause unreasonable economic ramifications including deterred lending, increased
lending costs, and inhibited economic growth.15 5
2.

Hypothetical Two

The author's proposal and LaFalce's amendment produce different
results where a lender is unable to resell property after foreclosing on a
hazardous waste site. Hypothetical two assumes that a lender foreclosed
on a security interest held in contaminated property, purchased it, and
has held title to the real estate for an extended length of time when the
EPA begins CERCLA clean-up. 15 6 The blanket exemption of LaFalce's
Amendment expunges the lender of liability; therefore, no inquiry is necessary regarding the reasons for the lender's delay in not immediately
reselling the property. The author's proposal, on the other hand, requires an examination into the lender's reasons for currently holding title
to the property.
As current ownership alone is not a viable basis for lender liability
under CERCLA, courts need to examine the reasons the lender still
holds title to the real estate to determine if the lender is benefitting from
a contaminated facility. Lenders not in the property management business ordinarily attempt to resell foreclosed property to realize on their
security interest. If the lender opts to resell, but is unable to do so because the property is contaminated with hazardous waste, the lender
should not be liable as a current owner because extended ownership is a
direct result of market forces and the existence of the hazardous waste
contamination. In this situation the lender, though acting prudently, is
not holding the property indefinitely but rather is unable to resell the
property and therefore should not be held liable under CERCLA. On
the other hand, if the lender opts to hold title to the real estate for reasons other than the inability to resell, such as for investment purposes,
then the lender should clearly be liable as a current owner because the
lender is in effect acting as a property manager. The lender's actions in
155. See supra notes 133-140 and accompanying text.
156. An extended length of time would be beyond that length of time necessary to resell the
property considering such factors as the economic climate where the property is situated and
whether or not the property was known to be contaminated with hazardous waste at the time the
property was placed on the market. This hypothetical is based on the situation presented to the
court in Maryland Bank & Trust Co. See supra notes 81-9o and accompanying text.
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holding title to foreclosed property clearly go beyond an attempt to protect or realize on a security interest. The lender who opts to hold title to
foreclosed property, for reasons other than the inability to resell due to
hazardous waste contamination, is not acting to protect its security interest and therefore the security interest exemption to liability would not
apply. It is clear that a lender's reasons for holding title to contaminated
property for an extended period of time must be established to determine
whether the lender is benefitting from a contaminated facility.15 7
B.

The Lender as an "Operator" under CERCLA
1. Hypothetical One

The two proposals could produce different results where a lender
provides managerial assistance to a debtor. This hypothetical presumes
that the lending agreement enables the lender to provide managerial
assistance to the debtor, and the lender does in fact provide assistance. 158
A court confronted with these circumstances, under current judicial interpretations of CERCLA, would hold the lender liable as an "operator." 15 9 This result is contrary to ordinary lending practices which
permit lenders to insist that the debtor accept management assistance in
order to protect its security interest. For example, a debtor plagued with
incapable management personnel requires managerial assistance. If no
assistance is provided, then CERCLA liability does not arise under either
proposed solution. Furthermore, if the lender contributes management
assistance neither LaFalce's amendment nor the author's proposal result
in the lender being liable for clean-up costs. However, LaFalce's amendment absolves the lender without regard to whether the lender's actions
contributed to the hazardous waste contamination. The author's proposal, on the other hand, only absolves the lender of liability as long as the
assistance provided to the debtor does not rise to the level of day-to-day
16
operations nor directly cause, or contribute to, the contamination. 0
Permitting lenders to provide managerial assistance furthers environmental interests in that lenders are not discouraged from monitoring
debtors' waste management activities, thus leading to early detection of
157. LaFalce's amendment, quite simply, fails to make these important distinctions and therefore does not satisfy the need presented by inconsistent judicial interpretations.
158. This hypothetical is based upon the situation presented when the court in Mirabile was
confronted with the liability of the Small Business Administration. See supra notes 68-75 and accompanying text.
159. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1988).
160. LaFalce's Amendment fails again to make these essential distinctions.
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contaminated facilities. Presumably, lenders desire to supervise debtors'
activities throughout the life of mortgages to protect their security interests.161 Although the underlying purpose of CERCLA is to promote safe
hazardous waste handling and disposal practices, 1 62 current court interpretations of the security interest exemption discourage lenders from becoming involved in the debtor's disposal practices for fear that the
lender's actions might be deemed "participation in the debtor's day-today activities." 1 63 While CERCLA's primary purpose is to provide a
solution to the hazardous waste problem, a supplemental objective is
holding liable only those who cause and benefit from hazardous waste
contamination." 6 Therefore, absolving the lender of liability where the
lender properly provides managerial assistance is in accordance with the
objectives of CERCLA.
2.

Hypothetical Two

The author's solution and LaFalce's amendment could potentially
result in divergent conclusions where lending institutions provide "dayto-day" managerial assistance to the debtor. Hypothetical two assumes
that a lender's officials engage in management activities, similar to the
concept of "participation in the management" of the facility. 6 Such
was the situation in Mirabile where bank officials gave general financial
advice, monitored cash collateral accounts, ensured that receivables went
to proper accounts, determined priority of filling orders, and established
a reporting system between the lender and the debtor.' 66 A lending institution should be permitted to control debtors' operations in this manner
because these actions are taken primarily to protect the lender's security
interest.
When the actions rise to the level of day-to-day management participation or when the participation is the direct cause of the contamination,
161. This presumption extends, not only from the fear of potential CERCLA liability, but also
from the fundamental nature of the transaction. A lender should want to ensure that the value of its
security interest is not being decreased by any deteriorative action, whether that action is hazardous
waste contamination or strip mining or any other similar action.
162. H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong. 2d Sess., pt. 1, 62, reprintedin 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN.

NEws 6119, 6139.

163. See Tom, Interpreting the Meaning of Lender Management Participation Under Section
101(20) (A) of CERCLA, 98 YALE L.J. 925, 931 (1989).
164. See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
165. This hypothetical is based upon the fact pattern presented in Mirabile,when the court was
dealing with the liability of Mellon Bank. See supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text.
166. United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl L. Rep. (Envtl L. Inst.) 20,992, 20,996 (Sept. 4, 1985).
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liability under CERCLA clearly follows.1 67 The bank officials in
Mirabile went beyond what should be permitted in that they insisted on
manufacturing changes, reassigned personnel, and even intimated that if
the debtor wanted further financing, the debtor had to accept the lender's
day-to-day supervision.168 Participation such as this extends beyond actions designed to protect security interests; rather, these actions amount
to involvement in the day-to-day operations. Likewise, if an official of
the lender is acting as an officer of the debtor, CERCLA liability follows
because this participation corresponds with day-to-day operations. However, if a lender's official serves on the board of directors of the debtor's
business, then no CERCLA liability need be imposed unless it is shown
that the official's actions as a director led to the reckless hazardous contamination. Acting as a director is conducive to providing financial advice, thus protecting the security interest, and ordinarily does not rise to
participation in the day-to-day operations. While the author's proposal
recognizes these distinctions, LaFalce's amendment fails to distinguish
between lenders who participate in the debtor's business to protect the
security interest and lenders who, through their participation, directly
cause the hazardous contamination.
Additionally, the frequency of visits, without considering the content of those visits, is not a valid determinative factor for CERCLA liability purposes. The court in Mirabile commented that, in some
instances, the loan officers visited the facility almost weekly.16 9 Lending
officials must be permitted to call on the debtor as often as necessary;
that determination being at their discretion. It is the content of the visits
which must be scrutinized to determine if the participation is connected
to the contamination.1 70 If an official orders certain actions which lead
to contamination, liability should clearly follow. However, if the official
visits only to check documents such as financial statements and produc17 1
tion schedules, no liability should arise.
167. The court in Mirabile would likely agree with this statement. The very reason that the

court refused to grant the lender's motion for summary judgment was the fact that the loan officer
was involved in the day-to-day activities of the debtor.

168. Here, an examination into the content of that "day-to-day supervision" is necessary because
determination of liability should be based on actual involvement.
169. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
170. Liability determinations are more properly made on the basis of the content of the activities
that the lender engaged in during the visits rather than the mere fact that the officials visited the
facility.
171. LaFalce's amendment fails again to make these essential distinctions.
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3.

Hypothetical Three

Post-default activities do not rise to the level of participation necessary to impose liability under CERCLA if such activities are limited to
contracting with auctioneers or cleaners and permitting auction purchasers to remove purchased equipment. 172 These activities are clearly related to liquidation of the facility and its assets and are undoubtedly
taken primarily to facilitate the realization on the lender's security

interest. 173
On the other hand, if removal actions actually cause the hazardous
contamination, liability must be imposed upon the lender and the party
conducting the removal actions. In Mirabile, the EPA alleged that the
actions of removing the equipment caused the hazardous waste contamination. If this were in fact true, 174 and is a common occurrence, then a
specific provision must be created to deal with this problem. Upon discovery of potential contamination, the lender should have a duty to ensure the safe and responsible removal of the equipment. Requiring
lenders to conduct environmental audits, 175 or take other steps calculated
to discover the potential for actual contamination protects the environment without placing an unequal burden on lenders. This scenario demonstrates, again, the failure of LaFalce's amendment to make distinctions
between conduct which should and should not result in liability since
LaFalce's amendment would exonerate all lenders without consideration
of the true cause of the hazardous contamination.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The only viable solution at this juncture is legislation designed to
confront the judicial glosses and resulting inconsistent interpretations of
CERCLA's security interest exemption. While there is good reason to
absolve lenders from liability, a blanket exemption is not the answer.
172. This fact pattern is based upon the scenario dealt with by the court in Fleet FactorsCorp.
See supra notes 97-126 and accompanying text.
173. This assumes that the contamination did not result from the actual removal of the equipment purchased. If the contamination arises because of the removal actions, then CERCLA liability

should follow.
174. The Mirabile court remanded this case to determine, among other things, if the removal
activities resulted in the asbestos contamination.
175. The Nat'l L.J., Feb. 5 1990, at SlO, col. 1. "[lit is essential to conduct an assessment of
environmental conditions at entities to be acquired before a transaction is closed." Idr at S13, col. 1.
It is presumed that an environmental audit would consist of elements similar to the "Phase I Environmental Audit" expressed in Representative Curt Weldon's proposed amendment to CERCLA.
See supra note 41. See also Warchall & Reis, EnvironmentalAuditing in Corporate Transactions,35
Fed. B. News & J. 445 (Dec. 1988).
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Distinctions must be made between those actions which will cause the
lender to incur liability and those which are acceptable under CERCLA.
LaFalce's amendment fails to make essential distinctions when dealing
with potential lender liability and provides ample opportunity for further
inconsistent judicial interpretations. Holding lending institutions liable
under CERCLA certainly augments the government's chance of recovering clean-up costs. However, the view that holds a lender liable whose
relationship is merely transitory insofar as the production and disposal of
hazardous substances is concerned is not in accordance with the purposes and objectives of CERCLA. Congress must examine the confusion
surrounding lender liability and the security interest exemption.
Michael F. Smith
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